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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is an Appeal of the District Court's decision that an Idaho Transportation 
Department Hearing Examiner had correctly determined that Ms. Bobeck had not met her 
burden to demonstrate a basis existed under LC. § l 8-8002A(7) to set aside the 
Department's Administrative License Suspension of Ms. Bobeck's driving privileges. 
b. Party References. 
The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as the "Department" for 
purposes of this argument. Ms. Bobeck is specifically referred to by name. Where "driver" 
is used, it is in reference to drivers generally. 
c. Reference to the Administrative Record. 
The references to the Department's Administrative Record are made to the 
Appellate Record page number not the Administrative Record page number. The 
Transcript of the Department's Administrative hearing is included in the Record on Appeal 
as an exhibit. The transcript of that hearing is referred to as the Administrative License 
Suspension Transcript (ALS Tr.) by page and number. 
d. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
On December 4, 2013 at approximately 2157 hours, Idaho State Trooper Travis 
Hight responded to a two vehicle non-injury automobile accident that preceded a one 
vehicle injury crash and a short, low speed pursuit by Lewiston Police Department. The 
pursuit ended with the second crash at 9th Street in Lewiston when the pursued vehicle 
struck a stationary Lewiston Police unit with activated overhead lights at the intersection 
of Idaho and 9th Streets. The original one vehicle accident occurred on Idaho Street near 
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13th Street approximately 4 blocks away. 
The driver was identified as Jonna Lynn Bobeck. Ms. Bobeck was transported to 
St. Joseph Regional Medical Center. 
Trooper Hight met Ms. Bobeck at the hospital and played the recording of the ALS 
I.C. § 18-8002 Advisory Form. A blood sample was obtained from Ms. Bobeck and 
Trooper Hight transported the blood to ISP District Headquarters, placing the blood sample 
into evidence for testing purposes. 
The blood tests results showed the presence of Zolpidem and Trazodone (R. pp. 
055-059). 
Ms. Bobeck was notified of the Administrative License Suspension on February 
12, 2014 (R. p. 60. 
Ms. Bobeck timely requested a hearing with the Idaho Department of 
Transportation's Hearing Examiner to consider the proposed Administrative License 
Suspension (R. pp. 048-052). 
A hearing was held telephonically on March 12, 2014 (R. p. 124). The Hearing 
Examiner entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order sustaining the 
Administrative Suspension of Ms. Bobeck's driving privileges on March 25, 2014 (R. pp. 
146-155). 
Ms. Bobeck timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review and the suspension was 
stayed pending the District Court's review (R. pp. 159-161). 
The District Court entered its Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review 
on October 24, 12014, affirming the Hearing Examiner's decision suspending Ms. 
Bobeck' s driving privileges. 
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Ms. Bobeck timely filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court's decision. The 
suspension of Ms. Bobeck's driving privileges has been stayed pending the conclusion of 
the Appellate Comi's judicial review. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Ms. Bobeck characterized the issues for the Court's review as follows: 
I. The District Court erred when it found the Hearing Officer's Order was 
supported by substantial evidence when the record is devoid of facts to 
support a finding that Mrs. Bobeck was informed pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section § l 8-8002A(2) where unconverted testimony was 
presented that the ALS Advisory Form was read to Mrs. Bobeck while 
she was asleep. 
IL The District Court erred when it relied on State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho 
709, 184 P. 3d 215 (Ct.App. 2008) where the Holding was overruled and 
otherwise not applicable to this case. 
III. The District Court erred when it based its decision on the applicability 
of the implied consent statute but the status was overruled and Mrs. 
Bobeck did not consent to the evidentiary blood draw. 
For purposes of the Department's response the issues are characterized consistent 
with Ms. Bobeck's burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7). 
1. Did Ms. Bobeck meet her burden to show that she was not informed of the 
consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as required by LC. § 18-
8002A(7)( e )? 
2. Whether Ms. Bobeck withdrew her implied consent to submit to evidentiary 
testing making the evidentiary testing a forced warrantless blood draw does 
not impact the use of the evidentiary test result in the Administrative 
License Suspension? 
Any other issues pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7)(a-d) have not been raised by 
Ms. Bobeck and are waived. Kugler v. Drowns, 119 Idaho 687, 809 P. 2d I I 16 (1991 ), 
Wheeler v. IDHW, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988, 996 (2009). 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the 
Hearing Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated because: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; 
or; 
( c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, 
l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not 
conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4 ), 
Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly when 
the test was administered; or 
( e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to 
evidentiary testing as required in subsection (2) of this section. 
The burden of proof rests on the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the 
suspension of I.C. § 18-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 
130 at 143 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for 
judicial review, I.C. § 67-5277. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) sets out the scope of review. "The Court shall not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions 
of fact." Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of Com 'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 915 P.2d 709 (1996). 
Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3) provides: 
When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provision of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or 
decisions are: 
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(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
( d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
( e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act is:" . 
. . if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded 
for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code§ 67-5279(3). 
The decision of the Transportation Department must be affi1med unless the order 
violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is made upon 
unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious or 
an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Department of Tramp., 13 7 Idaho 33 7, 48 P. 3d 666 
(2002). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred 
in a manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been 
prejudiced. Druffel v. State, Dept. of Tramp., 136 Idaho 853, 41 P.3d 739 (2002). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires the Court to review "the 
agency record independently of the District Comi's decision", Marshall v. Dept. ofTransp. 
137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. 
Did Ms. Bobeck meet her burden to show that she was not informed of the 
consequences o_fsubmitting to evidentiary testing as required by I. C. § J 8-
8002A (7)(e)? 
Ms. Bobeck contends that she has met her burden to demonstrate that she was not 
informed of the consequences of submitting to an evidentiary test. Ms. Bobeck argues that 
she could not understand the I. C. § l 8-8002A(2) Advisory provided her based upon her 
drug induced semi-conscious state. 
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Ms. Bobeck contends that the District Court's characterization of her argument 
should not require an analysis of whether she could comprehend the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing as required by LC. § l 8-8002A(2). 1 
1 LC. § I 8-8002A(2) provides: 
(2) Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, 
or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be 
informed that if the person refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing, or if the 
person submits to and completes evidentiary testing and the test results indicate an alcohol 
concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 1£:. 
8004, l 8-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the person shall be informed substantially as follows (but 
need not be informed verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary testing for alcohol 
or other intoxicating substances: 
(a) The peace officer will issue a notice of suspension; 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the notice of suspension of your 
driver's license to show cause why you refused to submit to or to complete and pass evidentiary 
testing and why your driver's license should not be suspended; 
( c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not request a hearing before the 
court or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be suspended. The suspension will 
be for one ( 1) year if this is your first refusal. The suspension will be for two (2) years if this is your 
second refusal within ten ( 10) years. You will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license 
during that period; 
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not request a hearing before the 
department or do not prevail at the hearing, your driver's license will be suspended. This suspension 
will be for ninety (90) days if this is your first failure of evidentiary testing, but you may request 
restricted noncommercial vehicle driving privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The suspension 
will be for one (I) year if this is your second failure of evidentiary testing within five (5) years. You 
will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that period; 
(e) However, if you are admitted to a problem solving court program and have served at least forty-
five ( 45) days of an absolute suspension of driving privileges, you may be eligible for a restricted 
permit for the purpose of getting to and from work, school or an alcohol treatment program; and 
(f) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at your own expense, have 
additional tests made by a person of your own choosing. 
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Ms. Bobeck would seem to argue that there is some difference in the District 
Court's analysis of whether Ms. Bobeck could comprehend the evidentiary test advisory 
provided her and whether she understood the advisory. This argument would appear to 
make a distinction without a difference. 
Ms. Bobeck clearly solicits her husband's testimony as to what Ms. Bobeck could 
"understand" at the time of Trooper Hight's providing her the Evidentiary Testing 
Advisory. 2 
Ms. Bobeck does not argue that the test results are incorrect or that she wasn't under 
the influence of the reported drugs, instead Ms. Bobeck argues that because she was semi-
conscious or asleep, that she has met her burden to show that she was not informed of the 
consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as required by I.C. § 18-8002A(7)( e ). It 
2 ALS TR. p. 30 LL. 16-24, p. 31 LL. 9-22 
16 Q. Okay. In the little bit of time you were there, 
17 including the time Officer Hight was there, based on your 
18 observations of her, even if she had been awake when the form 
19 was read, would she have been able to understand what was being 
20 read to her? 
21 A. Absolutely not. 
22 Q. And why do you say that? 
23 A. Quite Honestly, just she was out of it due to 
24 the - that - that situation. 
9 Q. And one of the things that the statute requires 
IO under l 8-8002A is that prior to submitting to an evidentiary 
11 test, that the - in this case that your wife be informed of 
12 the information that's on the form that Officer Hight read to 
13 her. And in your opinion, was she informed of that 
14 information? 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. And why do you say she was not informed of that 
17 information? 
18 A. Because she was asleep, other than being aroused 
19 by somebody's voice directly. If you touched her or asked her 
20 specifically her name, that she would wake up. So my memory, 
21 once he started reading the form start to finish, you 
22 know, it's like reading a child story time (inaudible). 
Transcript of Administrative Hearing, p. 30 LL. 16-24, p. 31 LL. 9-22. 
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is clear that Ms. Bobeck was informed pursuant to I. C. § 18-8002A(2) of the Evidentiary 
Test Advisory Information required to be given. 
There is no challenge that Ms. Bobeck was physically presented the I.C. § 18-
8002A Advisory Form by Trooper Hight or that the Advisory Form was not properly read 
to her, instead Ms. Bobeck simply argues that there is a previously unknown and apparently 
implicit requirement in the provisions of LC. § 18-8002A(7)(e) that the State must 
demonstrate that Ms. Bobeck was conscious and could understand the consequences of 
evidentiary testing. 3 
Ms. Bobeck cites no authority for this proposition. Clearly the record reflects that 
the requirements of I.C. § 18-8002A(7)( e) were met. Ms. Bobeck was read the Advisory 
Form and provided a properly executed copy of Advisory form (R. p. 39). Ms. Bobeck 
was then administered an evidentiary test to determine if she was under the influences of 
drugs, alcohol or other intoxicating substances. Based upon those evidentiary test results 
Ms. Bobeck failed an evidentiary test for drugs or other intoxicating substances (R. p. 043). 
Early in the review of the Administrative License Suspensions by the Department's 
Hearing Examiners, the Idaho Court concluded that the Department of Transportation and 
correspondingly Trooper Hight has no burden to show or disprove any of the grounds for 
challenging a suspension under I.C. § 18-8002A(7), Kane v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 139 
Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003). However, that is exactly what Ms. Bobeck argues 
3 The District Court properly analyzed Ms. Bobeck's characterization of the issue. "Law officers are required 
under LC. § l 8-8002A(3) to inform drivers of the consequences of failing or refusing evidentiary testing. 
They are not required to first ensure that a driver comprehends the information." FN In the foot note the 
District Court properly elaborates: "[flaw enforcement officers were required to ensure driver's comprehend 
the ALS warning in order to comply with I.C. § I 8-8002(3), drivers could avoid suspension by simply 
asserting they were too intoxicated to understand or remember the information." (R. p. 252). 
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here, that because she was asleep or semi-unconscious that she had met her burden to show 
that she was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing. 
Ms. Bobeck argues that I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(e) permits her to meet her burden by 
demonstrating that she was in a drug induced state of semi-unconsciousness. LC. § 18-
8002A(7)( e) does not require a determination of what Ms. Bobeck might have been 
thinking or what she might have understood. 
The Idaho Court has rejected a challenge to sufficient legal cause where the driver 
operates a motor vehicle under factual circumstances which the arresting officer believes 
demonstrates legal cause by the driver simply offering an alternative explanation of that 
behavior, " ... and his alternative explanations for his appearance and driving do not 
overcome the evidence possessed by the officer that Gibbar was under the influence of 
alcohol" In re Suspension of Driver's License of Gib bar, 143 Idaho at 944, 155 P.3d 1176 
(Ct. App. 2006). 
Instead consistent with Ms. Bobeck's burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) Ms. 
Bobeck is required to show Trooper Hight did not demonstrate the existence of legal cause 
or demonstrate a lack of compliance with evidentiary alcohol testing protocols or 
applicable here by reading and providing to Ms. Bobeck the Evidentiary Testing Advisory 
Form. 
Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)( e) is not ambiguous. However, Ms. Bobeck attempts to 
create an ambiguity by suggesting that word informed used in this context means that Ms. 
Bobeck is "knowledgeable, enlightened, up to date", using informed as an adjective instead 
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of using informed in this context as a verb indicating that Ms. Bobeck was "told, notified 
or advised" by Trooper Hight of the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing.4 
It is clear that Ms. Bobeck was indeed informed of the consequences of evidentiary 
testing. 
Consistent with the Court's decision in Kane v. State, Dept. of Transp., it is Ms. 
Bobeck's burden to present evidence affirmatively showing that one of the grounds for 
relief enumerated in I.C. 18-8002A(7) is met. Here, that means that Ms. Bobeck is required 
to show in fact that Trooper Hight did not inform her of the advisory as required by I.C. § 
18-8002A.5 
Clearly Ms. Bobeck's argument suggests that because she apparently could not 
understand the advisory being read to her because of her substantial impairment she should 
not suffer an Administrative License Suspension. It is clear that the Administrative License 
Suspension pursuant to I. C. § l 8-8002A is intended for a driver to suffer a consequence for 
the operation of a motor vehicle with an unlawful blood chemistry. 
As the District Court cautioned, in every Administrative License Suspension case, 
any driver could argue that their intoxicated or drug induced condition prohibited their 
understanding of the consequences of submitting to an evidentiary test (R. p. 252). Such 
4 http://dictionarv.referenced.com/browse/infonned 
Thus, it was Kane's burden to present evidence affirmatively showing one or more of the grounds 
for relief enumerated in § I 8-8002A(7). That is, it was his burden to prove that, in fact. the officer 
lacked legal cause to stop Kane's vehicle or that the blood test was, in fact, not conducted in 
accordance with legal requirements. 
Kane v. State, Dep't ofTransp., J 39 Idaho 586, 590, 83 P.3d J 30, J 34 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Given Ms. Bobeck's burden pursuant to I.C. § l 8-8002A(7), it is clear that "informed" is intended to be used 
as a verb not an adjective. 
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an interpretation tears at the fabric of the Administrative License Suspension process 
consistently upheld by the Idaho Courts and leads to an absurd statutory construction.6 
There is no requirement that the State demonstrate the particular mental or physical 
condition necessary for the driver to be notified of the consequences of participating in 
evidentiary testing. The circumstances of Ms. Bo beck's driving are unfortunate, however 
Ms. Bobeck does not contend that the results of the test were not accurate, she simply 
argues that her inability to understand the Evidentiary Test Advisory being read to her is 
the basis to avoid the Administrative License Suspension resulting from the failed 
evidentiary test. 
Ms. Bobeck does not argue that there was any consequence or prejudice to her 
based upon her apparent inability to comprehend the effect of a failed evidentiary test. 7 
If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not 
judicial. In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). The interpretation 
of a statute "must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not 
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. State v. Schwartz, 
139 Jdaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted). We have consistently held that 
where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should 
not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. City of 
Sun Valleyv. Sun Valley Co., 123 Jdaho 665,667,851 P.2d961, 963 (1993) at 893. 
Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). 
7 Trooper Hight does not treat Ms. Bobeck's condition as a refusal. Instead and respectfully Trooper Hight 
only conducts an evidentiary test to determine whether Ms. Bobeck's condition was as a result of the 
ingestion of drugs or other intoxicating substances. 
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2. 
Whether Ms. Bobeck withdrew her implied consent to submit to evidentiary 
testing making the evidentiary testing a forced warrant less blood draw does 
not impact the use of the evidentiary test in the Administrative License 
Suspension. 
The admissibility of the results of the evidentiary testing before the Hearing 
Examiner is not at issue in the Administrative License Suspension setting, LC. § 18-
8002A(7).8 
The Administrative License Suspension is an intentionally separate and unrelated 
proceeding from any criminal prosecution which may result from a failed evidentiary test, 
LC. § 18-8002A(7).9 
The Hearing Examiner acknowledged the circumstances of Ms. Bo beck's physical 
condition, correctly analyzed the then existing state of the Idaho Law acknowledging that 
there are no other reported cases other than criminal cases or refusal cases. 
8 Idaho Code § l 8-8002A(7) provides: 
The sworn statement of the arresting officer, and the copy of the notice of suspension issued by the 
officer shall be admissible at the hearing without further evidentiary foundation. The results of any 
tests for alcohol concentration of the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances by analysis 
of blood, urine or relating to calibration, certification, approval or quality control pertaining to 
equipment utilized to perform the tests shall be admissible as provided in section 18-8004( 4), Idaho 
Code. 
9ldaho Code § l 8-8002A provides: 
The facts as found by the hearing officer shall be independent of the determination of the same or 
similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. The 
disposition of those criminal charges shall not affect the suspension required to be imposed under 
the provisions of this section. 
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It is clear that Trooper Hight issued a Notice of Suspension containing the 
Evidentiary Test Advisory language (R. pp. 036-037). It is clear that Ms. Bobeck timely 
requested a hearing (R. pp. 048-052). It is clear that Ms. Bobeck suffered no consequence 
as a result of her apparent inability to understand the Evidentiary Test Advisory 
appropriately provided to her by Trooper Hight. Ms. Bobeck's timely request for an 
evidentiary hearing suggests that Ms. Bobeck understood the importance and significance 
of the evidentiary test advisory provided to her. There is no showing that Trooper Hight's 
reading of the Advisory Form mischaracterized or misstated the Advisory Form 
requirements, neither is there a showing that the form presented to Ms. Bobeck did not 
comply with LC. § 18-8002A(2). 10 
Ms. Bobeck's alleged inability to consent to an evidentiary test was not treated as 
a refusal. Any analysis of I.C. § 18-8002 is not helpful here. Neither was Ms. Bobeck's 
blood drawn over her or her husband's objection. This was not a forced blood draw after 
a known refusal. 
An examination of the circumstances of implied consent on a forced blood draw 
following a refusal to consent to evidentiary testing is not necessary here. The Idaho 
Court's application of the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decision in Missouri v. McNeely, 
133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696, 81 USLW 4250 (S.Ct. 2013) does not implicate Idaho's 
10 
"Thus the advisory form that was read to Kling differentiated between resident driver's licenses and 
non-resident licenses while the statute does not." 
State v. Kling, l 50 Idaho 188, 245 P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2010). 
This analysis also suggests that "informed" is a verb and not an adjective. Additionally, there is no suggestion 
here that the advisory provided did not "substantially inform" Ms. Bobeck of the consequences of submitting 
to evidentiary testing, I.C. § l 8-8002A(2). 
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Administrative License Suspension process, State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575 
(Idaho 2014). The McNeely decision dealt with the very narrow issue of whether a per se 
exemption to the requirement of a search warrant exists in drunk driving cases based on 
the State of Missouri's argument that the metabolization of alcohol and the resulting loss 
of evidence provided a basis for a warrantless blood draw. 11 
Clearly the SCOTUS McNeely decision does not in any way address the Idaho 
Administrative License Suspension based on a failed evidentiary test pursuant to I.C. § 18-
8002A. The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Wulf.[, id. appropriately limits it's decision to 
the narrow issued raised by SCOTUS in McNeely. 
Applicable here is Wu(ff's analysis of the cases relied upon by the Department's 
Hearing Examiner and the District Court: 
"Thus, we overrule Diaz, and Woolery to the extent that they applied Idaho's 
implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that constitutionally allowed 
forced warrantless blood draws. We hold the district court properly concluded that 
Idaho's implied consent statute was not a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement." (Emphasis added) State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 337 P.3d 575, 582 
(2014). 
The Idaho Court substantially limits its decision in Wulff to forced warrantless 
blood draws in criminal prosecutions. The analysis of the Wulff Court certainly doesn't 
apply in the Administrative License Suspension setting. The Hearing Examiner and 
District Court's reliance upon State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P. 3d 215 (Ct.App. 2008) 
and State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) prior to the Wu(fJCourt's 
II 
"In drunk driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not 
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." 
Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013). 
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limited overruling of those decisions does not diminish the legal basis for the Hearing 
Examiner and the District Court's confirmation of that decision. 12 
The Hearing Examiner's Findings and Conclusions applying DeWitt id., and 
Woolery id., were accurate statements of the law then and continue to be accurate given the 
Wulff Court's restraint in overruling State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 3 00, I 60 P. 3d 7 3 9 (S. Ct. 
2007) and Woolery, id.. 13 
The issue framed by Ms. Bobeck suggests that Ms. Bobeck refused to take the 
evidentiary test offered by Trooper Hight and therefore she was in some way physically 
12 
5.1 Bobeck was substantially informed of the Idaho Code § 18-8002A advisory form when 
Trooper Hight read the Notice of Suspension advisory form to her at the Saint Joseph's 
Regional Medical Center where she had been transported following the crashes. 
5.2 Idaho Code, §18-8002(1) provides that any person who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to 
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, provided that such testing is administered 
at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has 
been driving or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of Idaho Code, 
§ 18-8004. 
5.3 State v. DeWitt, 146 Idaho 709 (App.2008), set forth the proper analysis for the factual 
scenario presented in this matter. In De Witt, the driver/defendant argued that his implied 
consent was nullified because he was unconscious when he was "informed" of the 
consequences of refusal. The Idaho Court of Appeals upheld the ruling in State v. Woolery, 
116 Idaho 368 ( 1989), with the following analysis: 
"The [Woolery] Courts stated that a drunken driver has no legal right to resist or refuse 
evidentiary testing. The Court noted that in recognition of the driver's physical ability to 
refuse to submit, the legislature enacted the license suspension statute to discourage and 
civilly penalize such a refusal." 
5.4 Trooper Hight substantially informed Bobeck of the Notice of Suspension advisory that 
asserts in part that the driver is requested by law to take one or more evidentiary tests to 
determine the concentration of alcohol in the body. 
5.5 The advisement is accurate and consistent with policy and law. 
5.6 Based on the "Implied Consent" law referred to hereinabove, Trooper Hight's decision to 
request a blood test was lawful and pennissible. 
5.7 The advisory form includes the following information: "After submitting to the test(s) you 
may, when practicable, at your own expense, have additional tests made by a person of 
your own choosing." 
5.8 Bobeck was advised of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary testing as 
required by Idaho Code § 18-8002 and Idaho Code § ! 8-8002A. 
Findings ofFact, Conclusions of Law and Order, R. pp. 014-015. 
13 Neither is it necessary to retroactively apply McNeely based on the Wulff decision, see Rhoades v. State, 
149 Idaho 130,233 P.3d 61 (S. Ct. Idaho 2010). 
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forced to submit to a blood test. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Bobeck refused 
to submit to evidentiary testing. Ms. Bobeck's argument that she refused to submit to an 
evidentiary test is not supported by the record. Just as Ms. Bobeck could not "understand" 
the consequences of submitting to evidentiary testing as she argues, Ms. Bobeck was not 
able to revoke her implied consent and refuse the evidentiary testing. 14 
Ms. Bobeck has the burden pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A and LC. § 67-5279 to 
provide a factual basis for the Court's review, unfortunately an argument well made 
without anything else is not sufficient. 15 
It is simply not necessary to address the question of implied consent or a forced 
warrantless blood draw based upon this record to determine whether Ms. Bobeck met her 
burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A. 16 
14 Even if it were to be argued that the District Court's decision was based on an erroneous analysis, the 
appellate court may affirm the District Court's correct decision by applying the correct theory, McKinney v. 
State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144 (S. Ct. 1999). 
15 
·'We note initially that under I.C. § l 8-8002A(7) it was Gibbar's burden to produce evidence 
affirmatively showing .... " 
In re Suspension a/Driver's license of Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 943, 155 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Ct. App. 2006). 
16 The District Court also correctly concluded that Ms. Bobeck did not express a refusal to the evidentiary 
test to detennine if she was under the influence of drugs or other intoxicating substances (R. p. 252). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ms. Bobeck has not met her burden pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7). 
The Hearing Examiner's decision to suspend Ms. Bobeck's driving privileges 
should be sustained and Ms. Bobeck's driving privileges should be suspended for ninety 
days. 
DATED this day of May, 2015. 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true 
And correct copy of the foregoing 
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Post Office 
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Regular first class mail, and 
Deposited in the United States 
Post Oflice 




Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
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